



Public Lecture 9

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Bringing Peace and Human Rights Together

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Professor Mary Kaldor, 'Bringing Peace and Human Rights Together'

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Introduction

‘With all the fuss and noise’ wrote François Furet, the French historian, ‘not a single new idea has come out of Eastern Europe in 1989’. Timothy Garton Ash, in his eye witness accounts of the 1989 revolutions, said much the same thing. ‘The ideas whose time has come are old, familiar ones. (It is the new ideas whose time has passed)’. And Jürgen Habermas noted ‘a peculiar characteristic of this revolution, namely its total lack of ideas that are either innovative or oriented towards the future.’

It is true that the revolutionaries of 1989 did not propose new ways of organising the economy (and in the last two hundred years, competing ideas have tended to focus on the economy). But the period of the 1980s, which preceded the revolutions, was a ferment of ideas to which social movements in both East and West contributed. These ideas centred on the coming together of peace and human rights, on a new understanding of citizenship and of civil society, and on transnationalism or internationalism at the level of society. The concept of European or Global Civil Society, which is of course, a highly contested concept, can be said in some sense to encompass or encapsulate these strands of thinking.

It is worth noting that in the postscript to the new tenth anniversary edition of his book *We the People*, Timothy Garton Ash somewhat revises his opinion about whether there were new ideas. What was new, he now says, was the method – the non violence, the self organisation, the readiness to compromise – the ‘how’ not the ‘what’ of the revolution. But as I shall argue, the ‘how’ is a crucial component of new ways of thinking about politics in the contemporary situation.

Some of the new ideas of 1989 have been taken up in the political arena – the new emphasis on humanitarian intervention, on international legal arrangements and on support for and consultation with NGOs and pro democracy groups even though this approach is by no means dominant. But there is a need for academic research and teaching to catch up with these ideas, to test their relevance to the contemporary world, to question and explore their character. That is the aim of our new global civil society programme, based jointly at the Centre for the Study of Global Governance and the new LSE Civil Society Centre, which this lecture series is supposed to introduce.

What I am going to say is divided into two parts. The first part describes what happened in the 1980s from the perspective of what were then called new social movements in West and Central Europe and the evolution of their ideas. The second part draws out the conceptual implications of the ideas and their contemporary relevance

The 1980s

I want to start with two preliminary general remarks. First of all, in most accounts of the 1989 revolutions, rather little attention is paid to agency. Most explanations focus on the economic and moral bankruptcy of the communist regimes and the coming to power of Gorbachev; sometimes the effect of Reagan’s nuclear policies is also included as an explanation. Undoubtedly, these factors were important. But as I am

not a determinist, I think the first factor – the economic situation – is insufficient as an explanation. And while I do think the role of individuals in history can be important, no single individual can bear the weight of the 1989 revolutions. So what I am going to talk about is agency – the actions and behaviour and thinking of the actors who actually carried out the revolutions in the period immediately preceding 1989.

A second general remark concerns the title of this lecture – the coming together of peace and human rights. During the Cold War, these concepts were strictly separated and indeed their separation can be said to have been part of the logic of the Cold War. ‘Peace’ was a word espoused by the Soviet Union, partly because of its efforts to maintain the status quo in Europe and because it was behind in the arms race, and also more importantly perhaps because the ideology was centred around the notion of permanent struggle and built on the terrible experiences of World War II. As Vaclav Havel pointed out in an essay addressed to the West European peace movement entitled ‘An Anatomy of Reticence’, the word ‘peace’ had been stripped of all its content. When those who opposed the Cold War and nuclear weapons in the West described themselves as peace movements, they appeared, mostly unwittingly, as apologists for the Soviet system. It was therefore relatively easy to marginalise their activities.

The West espoused ‘human rights’ and, for many on the left, this phrase was also discredited because of the instrumental way in which the term was used. Human rights violations in places like Pakistan or Brazil under military rule or Pinochet’s Chile were ignored because these regimes were anti Communist, part of the ‘Free World’. It was the breakdown of the separation between peace and human rights – first from above, in the 1975 Helsinki Accord, and then from below as opposition groups in East and West embraced each others’ causes – which contributed in important ways to the 1989 revolutions and the end of the Cold War.

Ideas in East Central Europe

The main source of new ideas was the intellectuals in Central Europe in the late 1970s and 1980s. During the 1950s and 1960s, the main form of opposition was reform communism or revisionism. Thinkers like György Lukacs or Leszek Kollokowski, who were to influence the 1968 generation, outlined the possibilities for a human socialism, while remaining firmly within the Marxist tradition. Revisionism was defeated over and over again in 1953 (East Germany), 1956 (Hungary and Poland), and finally in 1968 (Czechoslovakia). The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia dealt a deathblow to the hopes of reforming communism. As the East German writer Christa Wolf was later to say, it was an ‘existential shock’. And Kollokowski wrote that ‘no longer can communism be considered an intellectual problem, it is merely about the exercise of power.’

After 1968, the main form of opposition was the individual dissident. The dissidents saw themselves not as precursors of a political movement but as individuals who wanted to retain their personal integrity. Dissidence was about the dignity of the individual as much as about politics.

A turning point was the 1975 Helsinki Accord. The Helsinki Accord, on the one hand, confirmed the territorial status quo in Europe, for which the Soviet Union had pressed, and, on the other hand, contained commitments to respect human rights, which the East European governments had accepted under Western pressure. The initial reaction in East European opposition circles was negative. Western leaders were to be seen embracing Soviet leaders and the commitment to human rights was thought to be purely cosmetic. After all, when Nixon and Kissinger went to Moscow in 1972, they ignored the Jewish refuseniks protesting at the gates of the Kremlin. According to Milan Šimecka, who was later to become a Charter 77 spokesperson:

‘I remember how all those disarmament talks in the seventies –even Helsinki itself looked very dubious dealing to us, like a party at the expense of the East Europeans which we paid for in the currency of imprisonment, decline, and stagnation.

This was not entirely true, of course, and as it turned out, what seemed no more than agreements on paper about human rights were, amazingly enough, to prove instrumental in achieving certain improvements. The third basket at Helsinki was originally intended as the price the Soviet Union had to pay for recognition of the status quo in Europe. The Soviet Union was only too happy to pay it, since our political culture contained thousands of artfully contrived methods for skirting human rights obligations. Indeed, in Czechoslovakia, the immediate post Helsinki period was a time of the worst persecutions. A deaf ear was turned to any reference to the Helsinki Final Act and, as I know from personal experience, any talk of Helsinki in those days would send police officers into fits of laughter.

That all assumes a different aspect, however, if looked at in longer perspective. Over these past years.... much has changed. Concepts have emerged which were previously unknown. These concepts undoubtedly penetrated the reform thinking then coming to fruition in the Soviet Union. If nothing else, by confirming the outcome of World War II, Helsinki served to rid the Soviet Union of its old obsessions about external threats, and this subsequently had a positive effect on its attitude to détente.’

In the late 1970s, Helsinki provided the impetus for the formation of new groups to defend human rights –Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia, KOR (the defence of workers) in Poland and the Democratic Opposition in Hungary. It was during this period that the new ideas began to emerge. A key text was Adam Michnik’s path breaking essay ‘The New Evolutionism’ written in 1978. Michnik argued that the task of the opposition was not to seize power but to change the relationship between state and society. Through self organization, it was possible to create autonomous spaces in society up to the limits imposed by the Brezhnev Doctrine, i.e. the threat of Soviet intervention. It was Michnik who rediscovered the term civil society. But he used it in a new way, not merely as the rule of law and the institutions to check abuses of the state, but the emphasis was on self organisation, autonomy, solidarity and non violence. Of course, nothing is really new – Michnik’s concept of civil society was probably closest to that of De Tocqueville. Nevertheless in the context of the overbearing state and the emergence of new groups and movements, the term had an entirely new resonance, as a political aspiration and technique and not just an analytical tool.

Similar concepts were developed elsewhere in Central Europe. These included: 'Anti Politics' (the term developed by Vaclav Havel and György Konrad) – a sphere of society that escapes the total hold of the Communist state; 'Living in Truth' (Vaclav Havel) – the notion of refusing the lies of the political class; or the 'parallel polis' developed in Czechoslovakia – the idea of a self organized Aristotelian polis organised around the virtuous life which would, as it were, spread out and gradually chip away at the formal political institutions. In 'The Power of the Powerless' Havel described the grocer who puts the slogan 'Workers of the World Unite' in his shop window not because he believes it but as a badge of loyalty. Milan Kusy, another Czechoslovak intellectual talked about the 'as if game' in which the grocer behaves 'as if' he believes in the slogan and the authorities behave 'as if' they believe he believes. This is a system in which every individual is both victim and accomplice. The realm of 'anti politics' or the parallel polis was one where the individual would refuse such collaboration with the regime, however token, in which the 'as if game' would be rejected. In all these discussions, the role of the individual and the importance of personal links, something that was central to individual dissidence, were considered primary, overriding claims to political authority.

These ideas reflected a new reality in Central Europe – the emergence of social movements and citizens groups. The best known was Solidarity in Poland but there was also Swords into Ploughshares in the GDR and the Dialogue Group, a young peoples peace group, in Hungary. The New Cold War of the early 1980s squeezed the space for these groups. The crackdown on Solidarity took place in 1981. And the deployment of cruise missiles and a new generation of Soviet missiles provided the occasion for the authorities to try to disperse Swords into Ploughshares and the Dialogue group.

In the late 1980s, a second generation of groups and movements developed. These included Frieden und Menschenrechtung (Peace and Human Rights) in the GDR led by Bärbel Bohley, Wolnosc I Pokoj (Freedom and Peace) in Poland, several small peace groups in Czechoslovakia such as the Independent Peace Association or the John Lennon Society, and the Danube Circle and FIDESZ (the young democrats) in Hungary. The spread of these groups, however small, began to undermine the sustainability of the regimes, which depended on total control – small autonomous spaces were multiplying; civil society, in Michnik's sense was beginning to roll back the totalitarian state. And it was these groups who helped to organise the mass demonstrations and who participated, along with the earlier generation in the Round Table talks

Ideas among the West European peace movements

A second source of new ideas was the West European peace movement which exploded across Western Europe in the early 1980's and, in particular, the dialogue with the opposition in Central Europe. In a way, the peace movement can also be considered an offshoot of the Helsinki process, even though peace activists were less aware than their Central European counterparts of the content of the Helsinki Accords. In the atmosphere of détente that followed the Helsinki Accords, the fading of the Soviet threat and the increased travel and communication with the East, it seemed unthinkable to deploy a new generation of nuclear weapons in Europe and to return to the hostile rhetoric of the 1950s. There were peace camps at all the proposed

missile bases – Greenham Common being the most well known – and some 5 million people demonstrated against the missiles across Europe in the autumn of 1981 and again in the autumn of 1983.

Parts of the new peace movement, most notably European Nuclear Disarmament (END) led by the historian E.P.Thompson, the Dutch Inter Church Peace Council whose Secretary General was Mient Jan Faber, and the West German Greens whose most well known spokesperson was Petra Kelly – put the emphasis on opposition to the Cold War and not just nuclear weapons. END called for a transcontinental movement of citizens and made an explicit link between peace and democracy or human rights. Echoes of Central European ideas can be found in the thinking of the peace movements, although the discourse was less elaborated. The issue of nuclear weapons was treated as democracy issue. How can we claim to be democratic when control over life and death is in the hands not even of our own politicians but decided in Washington or Brussels? How can nuclear weapons be used to defend human rights when their use would kill millions of people? Getting rid of nuclear weapons was to be achieved, not by seizing power but as in the East, by changing the relations between state and society. Some of the ideas developed in the women's movement during the 1970s had relevance to this kind of politics; the term 'control over our lives' rearticulated the feminist concern with 'control over our bodies'. Nuclear weapons and the apparatus around them were seen as a 'male' totalitarian enclave in our society. The mantra 'deterrence keeps the peace' could be viewed, at least for powerholders, as the Western equivalent of 'Workers of the World Unite'.

E.P.Thompson talked about a 'healing process' between East and West, about creating autonomous spaces beneath the structures of the Cold War through which citizens could come together. Mient Jan Faber coined the phrase 'détente from below' to complement the détente from above initiated by the Helsinki process. As in the East, a similar emphasis was placed on personal relations. The END Appeal of 1980, largely drafted by E.P.Thompson, stated:

'We must defend and extend the right of all citizens, East and West, to take part in this common movement and to engage in every kind of exchange...We must commence to act as if [was this a conscious reference to the "as if" game?] a united, neutral, pacific Europe already exists. We must learn to be loyal not to "East" or "West" but to each other and must disregard the prohibitions and limitations imposed by any national state.' In effect, the idea was transnational anti politics or, in the words of a Czechoslovak dissident Martin Palous, a parallel cosmopolis.

The Importance of the Dialogue

The dialogue between the peace movement and the East European groups was important in several respects. First of all, the East/West strategy was by no means widely accepted. On the contrary, it was bitterly contested within the peace movement, among the Central European groups and in the dialogue between them. The decade of the 1980s was a period of intense debate about how to achieve democracy and human rights in Eastern Europe. Which came first, peace or democracy? What was the appropriate strategy for ending the Cold War? There were those in the peace movement who argued that human rights would follow disarmament and that the worst evil was nuclear weapons; by taking up the human

rights issue, groups like END were endorsing the Western leaders' Cold War rhetoric and thus reducing the chances of disarmament. And there were those in the East who argued that the Soviet Union only understands force and the West therefore needed to be strong; unilateralism was appeasement and disarmament would only be possible after the fall of communism. By the end of the decade there was a growing consensus, at least among those who took part in the dialogue, that democracy in Eastern Europe was the best strategy for ending the Cold War but, at the same time, democracy could be best achieved within the framework of a détente process and a wind down of the arms race.

There was also intense debate about how to relate to dictators and oppressors. At one end of the scale, were those, primarily in Communist Parties but also the German Social Democrats, who considered that the priority was a dialogue with officials, particularly the peace committees and that dialogue with the opposition should not publicly disturb this official dialogue. And at the other end of the scale were those, primarily in the opposition in the East, who felt there should be no communication with officials, that any communication was a form of collaboration. In between there was a range of positions, which varied according to particular situations.

These debates were a form of education, a learning process. The thinking of many individuals was profoundly influenced by these discussions and many of those individuals are in power to day in both East and West.

Secondly, through the dialogue, the peace movement was able to expand the space in which the East European groups operated and to assist communication between them.

In part, the peace movement represented an inspiration to young people who wanted to be able to demonstrate as in the West. As one young pastor put it at the Dresden Peace Forum in 1982:

'In our television news we see lengthy reports of West European peace movements; and there are many young people who ask why it is so difficult to do such things here. People want to know why, in this country, where there is after all so much talk of peace, wearing the "Swords into Ploughshares" badge, for instance, can lead to so many difficulties.'

For many young people, a direct connection was made between the Cold War and their own situation. 'We have got used to a divided Europe' one of the founders of the Hungarian group Dialogue wrote in 1983 'it has become too much part of our consciousness, it does not even occur to us that it can be changed. I am afraid that this already absurd situation could deteriorate further. It would be unbearable to have closed borders, the halt of mutual commerce, hatred, preparations of one side against the other, and a national paranoia behind every critical voice.

'The fight to avoid and prevent this gives me a tangible purpose. Our first documents which came out after long discussion, indicate that we think of the Cold War as our primary enemy and the struggle and its style are indicated by one of the meanings of our name: Dialogue.'

But the peace movement also provided support and visibility to the groups in Central Europe and, in effect, acted as a kind of umbrella especially in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. In the GDR and Poland, the Churches were able to offer some shelter to the new groups; this was not possible in the other countries. In the end, the issue of how to relate to officials became a matter of necessity. Since the official peace committees had the job of liaising with Western peace groups, peace activists were able to make use of this privileged access and to put pressure on them to tolerate the existence of the East European groups. In the case of Hungary, for example, the Dialogue group was allowed to exist for a few months until the deployment of cruise missiles because of the argument made by Western peace activists that the existence of a genuine independent peace group in Hungary helped the campaign against cruise missiles and provided the beginnings of an answer to the question frequently raised 'Why not demonstrate in Moscow?'

Finally, the endless negotiation and pressure on officials, about travel or holding meetings or the release of individual activists, did eventually begin to influence 'insiders' who contributed to the non violent nature of the 1989 revolutions. 'It is like water dripping on a stone' one official told me privately. It helped to crack the determination of the regimes. Above all, it helped to influence the 'new thinking' of the Gorbachev regime as Alexi Pankin argues in his lecture in this series.

What the peace movement added to the ideas of the Central European intellectuals was transnationalism – the idea of networks of citizens, which could cross borders and bore holes into closed societies. And it was not just East West networks. By the end of the decade, the peace movement was able to facilitate East East networking as well. It was the many small holes that penetrated the Cold War structures, Jan Kavan the Czech Foreign Minister said in a recent BBC2 programme, that helped to undermine the whole edifice. The new ideas were thus a combination of transnationalism or globalisation and, at the same time, a new understanding and extension of democracy focussing on concepts like empowerment, participation, and deliberation, which have become so important in the 1990s.

I am aware that social scientists will never agree about the relative importance of the different factors that led to the end of the Cold War. The significance of the 1989 revolutions will be perceived differently depending on underlying theoretical perspectives. But one test of a good explanation is its predictive power. Those who studied Eastern Europe 'from above', who studied economic trends or the composition of politburos, failed to predict the 1989 revolutions. In the aftermath of the revolutions, there was much soul searching in think tanks across the United State in particular. Those who were engaged in the dialogue knew that change was under way; they did not predict the form of the 1989 revolutions but they did expect something to happen. I would like to quote from E.P.Thompson, writing in 1982:

'What we can glimpse now ...is a détente of peoples rather states – a movement of peoples which sometimes dislodges states from their blocs and brings them into a new diplomacy of conciliation, which sometimes runs beneath state structures, and which sometimes defies the ideological and security structures of particular states...

'The Cold War road show, which each year enlarges, is now lurching towards its terminus. But in this moment changes have arisen in our continent, of scarcely more

than one year's growth, which signify a challenge to the Cold War itself. These are not "political" changes in the usual sense. They cut through the flesh of politics down to the human bone...

'What I have proposed is improbable. But, if it commenced, it might gather pace with astonishing speed. There would not be decades of détente as the glaciers slowly melt. There would be rapid and unpredictable changes; nations would become unglued from their alliances; there would be sharp conflicts within nations; there would be successive risks. We could roll up the map of the Cold War and travel without maps for a while.'

Conceptual Implications

The concepts of peace and human rights are associated with the rise of the nation state. Sir Michael Howard has written about the emergence of the concept of peace after the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) as periods of peace began to alternate with periods of war. The idea of natural rights, or later the rights of man, which were the forerunners of human rights, developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, linked to the notion of a social contract through which states are established. Natural rights, the rights possessed by man in a state of nature, were voluntarily abrogated in exchange for rights guaranteed by the state, in particular security or the right to life (Hobbes) and liberty (Locke). Peace was about the absence of war, the relation between states. Human rights were about the relation between the state and its citizens. Peace referred to the external arena, an area outside the social contract characterised by anarchy; human rights were about domestic or internal peace. The notion of rights was linked to the idea of civil society and a domestic rule of law in contrast to the state of nature that prevailed in the international arena. The external was the world of *realpolitik*, of blood and iron; the internal was the world of politics and law. Violence was, as it were, pushed outwards beyond the boundaries of the nation state. According to Rousseau:

'Should we have been slow to see that... each one of us being in the civil state as regards our fellow citizens, but in the state of nature as regards the rest of the world, we have taken all kinds of precautions against private wars only to kindle national wars a thousand times more terrible?'

In fact, of course, wars did take place on somebody's territory and appalling tragedies were inflicted on ordinary people during wars. For us in Britain, the internal/external distinction seems applicable because, in practise, wars did take place abroad. But elsewhere in Europe, the distinction was conceptual, about the character of violence. In a sense, one could argue that the implicit contract through which states were established guaranteed individual rights or domestic peace in exchange for an abrogation of those rights in wartime. In peacetime, the citizen was an individual; in wartime, he (and it usually was 'he') became part of the collectivity, the state. Effectively, the citizen gained individual rights in exchange for unlimited liability in time of war –hence the importance of being prepared to die for one's country.

Of course, reality was much more complicated. Modern war, war between nation states, was hedged in by all kinds of constraints and justified by secular rationality.

The rights of man were envisaged by liberal thinkers, from the beginning, as universal even if the social contract applied only partially. Hence, nearly all liberal thinkers developed models of perpetual peace, which applied to the relations between states. The most famous was probably the model of Immanuel Kant, published in 1795, which explicitly envisaged a notion of cosmopolitan right overriding state sovereignty.

The nation state was an imperfect institution and, I would argue, at least in its absolutist form had begun to crack already by 1914 under the twin pressures of increasing interconnectedness of economies and societies and the difficulties of sustaining clear boundaries, and, at the same time, growing demands for emancipation, for further extensions of rights. It took two unbelievably barbaric wars before a temporary solution was found. That solution was the blocs.

The blocs involved an extension of civil society or domestic peace across groups of nations. Violence was, as it were, pushed further outwards. It could be argued that a renewed contract was established in which huge emancipatory gains were made primarily in economic and social domains, in exchange for readiness to be part of a bloc wide collectivity and participate in a war of unimaginable proportions. It was a war sustained in our imaginations through the reproduction of an ever more fearsome military confrontation, through spying games and hostile rhetoric. I have used the term 'imaginary war' to describe the Cold War. We lived as though we were at war and the war shaped our membership in collectivities just as earlier wars had shaped the 'imagined communities' of the nation. For the West, the threat of nuclear war was justified by the absence of human rights in the East and the risk that totalitarianism might spread and for the East, the absence of human rights was justified by the permanent threat of war. Whereas in the West, the war system or the military industrial complex as it became known was only one element of society albeit with profound implications, in the East the war system encompassed society so that individual identity was permanently eclipsed.

In much of my work, I have argued that the Soviet system is best understood not as socialism but as a war system, that the centralisation, discipline, mobilisation, and paranoia were typical of societies at war. Moreover, the system functioned most effectively in wartime. This idea was first formulated by the Polish reform economist Oskar Lange in a lecture given in Belgrade in 1957. But it was anticipated by George Orwell in the book *1984*, which was widely read by East European dissidents. When, the hero Winston Smith reads the book, which describes the system under which he lives, he discovers that:

'War, it will be seen, is now a purely internal affair. In the past, the ruling groups of all countries, although they might recognise their common interest and limit the destructiveness of war, did fight against one another, and the victor always plundered the vanquished. In our own day, they are not fighting against one another at all. The war is waged by each ruling group against its subjects, and the object of war is not to make or prevent conquests of territory but to keep the structure of society intact.'

What the dialogue of the 1980s achieved was to undermine this logic. By the end of the 1980s, there was an increasingly shared consensus that détente from above and from below provided a framework for opening up Eastern Europe, for creating

autonomous spaces and laying the basis for democratisation, that weakening of the war system was a precondition for independent political claims. And, by the same token, the widening of the spaces, the beginnings of the process of democratisation was clearly the most effective strategy for dismantling the structures of the Cold War.

In the aftermath of the collapse of the blocs, the distinction between internal and external, between peace and human rights, is rapidly eroding. The new wars, which are the subject of my current research, are, at one and the same time, massive violations of human rights. They are wars of the state or of private groups against citizens not wars between states. But nor are they internal wars. They spill over borders through refugees, Diaspora groups, and criminal networks and have a tendency to spread. At the same time, new global instruments are being developed to cope with this kind of violence. Many of these instruments were fashioned beneath the structures of the Cold War – the various human rights conventions, treaties and bodies, international economic institutions, not to mention the kind of citizen networking that took place in the 1980s. But they have come into their own and indeed have been immeasurably strengthened in the context of an accelerated process of globalization that followed the breaching of the last bastion of what my colleague Meghnad Desai calls deglobalization and the rapid spread of electronic technologies, especially Internet.

I believe we face a stark choice – between a global civil society, by which I do not mean world government but rather a global peace and a global rule of law, underpinned by an active and alert transnational citizenry, and a reversion to some kind of pre modern patterns of violence but even more pervasive than in the pre modern period. Of course, the legacies of the Cold War are still with us – the continued persistence of the military lobby, the belief in virtual or costless war, the way in which ‘solutions’ to human rights problems are conceived in terms of missiles. The bombing of Yugoslavia, in a way, can be understood as a kind of compromise between the new globalist approach towards peace and human rights that has its roots in the ideas of 1989 and the legacies of Cold War thinking.

To conclude: My argument is that there were indeed new ideas and they can be summed up in the concept of global civil society. 1989 did represent a profound rupture with the past that is difficult for us to comprehend. In the stirrings of thought that developed beneath the structures of the Cold War were the beginnings of some new concepts and practises that can help us to analyse our immensely complex contemporary world. One of the reasons it was so difficult to identify the new ideas of 1989 was because we had not come to terms with the radical changes currently taking place. We only had old situations, earlier revolutions, the simplicities of the past, by which to describe what was happening. Perhaps if we meet again in ten years time, the ideas will have crystallised further and it will be easier to make judgements

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As this was a lecture I have not given the references in the text. But the sources for quotations are included below.

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